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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the discovery process of a recent and extraordinarily successful, non-
traditional, export activity in developing country – namely the flower industry in Ethiopia. To be 
able to break into non-traditional exports, developing countries do not need to invent new 
products, but mainly producing at lower cost goods that are already established in the world 
markets. This necessitates tapping into the global pool of knowledge and diffusion of the 
imported technology in the course of experimentation. This is an ongoing learning process which 
involves continuous interaction among different actors, institutions and networks. The paper 
adopts a functional innovation systems framework in a catching-up country context, to map the 
dynamics of the interactions among various actors in the discovery process and how 
success was achieved. It provides detailed information on sector development based on a 
recently conducted census of all flower farms in Ethiopia and follow-up interviews with industry 
leaders and policy makers. The study highlights the strategic collaboration required between 
government and the private sector in the promotion of a non-traditional export in a developing 
country. It should enrich our understanding of development strategies in the context of an 
increasingly globalized world. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The process of development requires a shift from producing simple goods based on traditional 
activities to complex goods applying new technologies and methods, often referred to as 
structural transformation (Rodrik, 2007). The importance of exporting in the development 
process has been widely documented. Exports are the main source of foreign exchange, 
economies of scale and specialization, and technology in developing countries (Lall, 2000). Also, 
producing for the global market provides opportunities for further learning. Hausmann, Hwang, 
and Rodrik (2005) find a strong and positive relationship between a country’s level of income 
and the income implied by its exports. They show that countries with more advanced export 
packages are likely to grow more rapidly.  
In an increasingly globalized world, export success is more  important than ever for the 
economic performance of developing countries and diversification into high-value, non-
traditional exports, therefore, is a major objective of many of these countries. However, 
successful emergence of new export activities and subsequent structural transformation, are not a 
natural or automatic process. They are challenging and require various impediments to be 
overcome, and often positive inducements from government.  
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA, hereafter) is the developing world region that has the highest 
dependence on exports of traditional primary products (UNCTAD, 2008). Although, 
diversification into non-traditional high value exports is advocated as an alternative export 
promotion strategy the performance of the sub-continent has been generally unsatisfactory. 
UNECA and AU (2007) point out that since the early 1980s Africa’s diversification record has 
been volatile, and gains fragile and short-lived. However, in recent years, a few SSA countries 
(e.g. Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Zambia) have made 
some progress in diversifying into non-traditional horticultural products for export (UNCTAD, 
2008).  
The Ethiopian flower industry represents an extraordinarily fast and successful 
diversification into a non-traditional export product. The floriculture industry began to emerge in 
the late 1990s and in less than a decade, and despite its late entry into the flower export industry, 
Ethiopia became the 5th largest non-EU exporter to the EU cut-flower market and the 2nd largest 
(after Kenya) flower exporter from Africa in 2007. Riungu, Catherine in her article entitled 
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“Ethiopia’s flower sector outgrows Kenya” in a leading Kenyan newspaper, Nation Media, in 
September, 11, 2007 describes this spectacular performance thus:  
Ethiopia is now Africa’s second largest flower exporter after Kenya, with its export 
earnings growing by 500% over the past year. This has left Kenya stunned, given that 
five years ago, the Horn of Africa country was doing less than $20 million of exports 
compared with the East African giant’s $300 million. It is estimated that, this year, 
Ethiopia will close its books at $120 million, slightly less than half of Kenya’s earnings. 
‘It has taken Ethiopia five years to achieve half of what we have in three decades,’ … 
Going by this rate, Kenya could be overtaken by Ethiopia in a decade, he added. 
The export promotion strategy adopted by the incumbent government in 1998, provides an 
extended list of sectors and activities to be prioritized for support, but makes no mention of the 
flower industry. Government was unaware of the major opportunity offered by this industry and 
provided no specific support until the end of 2002. The industry emerged based on private, 
entrepreneurial experimentation. So what triggered the emergence of the sector and how did it 
evolve? What have been the relative roles of the state and the private sector in the process of 
discovery of the flower industry? What lessons can be learnt from this astonishing success for 
the promotion of non-traditional exports? The objective of this study is to address these and other 
related issues in the course of examining the ‘discovery’ process of the Ethiopian flower industry. 
Understanding of this process should enrich our understanding of development strategies for 
promoting non-traditional activities. This study exploits two main data sources, a census survey 
conducted in early 2008 and follow-up interviews with industry leaders and policy makers.1 
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 explores a new analytical framework to explain 
the successful emergence of non-traditional exports in developing countries. Section 3 gives 
some background on policy and the flower industry. Section 4 maps the evolution of the 
Ethiopian flower industry using the framework developed in Section 2. Section 5 summarizes the 
main findings.  
 
                                                 
1
 The survey was a collaborative project between the Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI) and the 
Japanese National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS). Information was obtained from 64 out of 67 flower 
farms (almost 96%) operational in January 2008. One of the authors of this paper coordinated the survey and 
conducted face to face follow-up interviews. 
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2. How do new export activities emerge successfully in developing countries? An analytical 
framework 
 
Interest in industrial policy and in particular on the right balance between the role of the market 
and the role of the state has increased in recent years. Rodrik, (2004, 2007), Hausmann and 
Rodrik (2003, 2006); Hausman and Kilinger (2006); Hausman, Hwang, and Rodrik (2005) 
among others, all provide insights on industrial policy and the promotion of new export activities 
in developing countries within an increasingly international context. Despite the widely held 
view (commonly referred as ‘resource curse’) that diversification into primary commodities and 
natural resources can be detrimental to on countries’ growth prospects, this literature defines 
industrial policy as stimulating specific economic activities and promoting structural change in 
both industry and also non-traditional agriculture and service sectors (Rodrik, 2007).  
 This emerging literature perceives successful promotion of new export activity as process of 
‘self-discovery’ and ‘ongoing learning’. Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) define ‘self-discovery’ as 
the process of establishing the cost structure of an economy for the production of goods, already 
available in the world market. They argue that the factor endowment model which predicts a 
broad structure of comparative advantage (e.g. labor intensive, natural resource based products, 
etc.) is too broad a classification to be helpful, as hundreds or even thousands of products may be 
included in its categories. To be successful, policies need to focus on specific activities. This has 
at least two important implications for the promotion of new activities, both of which justify 
government interventions.  
 First, producing a new product involves highly specific and customized inputs – which may 
be both private and public. Firms that venture into new products will face difficulties in securing 
the requisite inputs (Hausmann and Klinger, 2006). For some, there may not be markets which 
can create serious coordination problems (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006). Second, the profitability 
and success of a new activity cannot be known with certainty ex ante. There is a large element of 
uncertainty in terms of what a country will be good at producing, and much randomness in the 
process of discovering this. The discovery process requires entrepreneurial experimentation. 
However, entrepreneurial experimentation in new activities is costly and rife with market failures 
(e.g., information externalities and coordination failures). Private businesses are less willing to 
take risks; hence, coordination and provision of rents by governments are required to stimulate 
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the discovery process (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006). This process of identification of more 
competitive activities should lead to structural transformations; however, the roadmap is unclear. 
Despite providing some very useful insights, this literature offers little guidance about how to 
identify the key policy problems and does not propose an explicit framework for understanding 
the process of emergence of new activities. This is partly due to its reliance on the concept of 
‘market failure’ to justify government interventions. Cimoli, Dosi, Nelson, and Stiglitz (2006) 
argue that “… the ’market failure‘ language tends to be quite misleading in that, in order to 
evaluate the necessity and efficacy of any policy, it takes as a yardstick those conditions under 
which standard normative (“welfare”) theorem holds. … In a profound sense, when judged with 
standard canons, the whole world can be seen as a huge market failure!” According to Metcalfe, 
(1994) market failures provide a general rationale for policy intervention but do not provide 
specific guidance to policy makers. In fact, they create problems for policy makers because each 
case of market failure requires new policy. Market failures also increase the real cost of policy 
making given their ubiquitous nature.   
 To be able to break into non-traditional exports developing countries does not necessarily 
need to invent new products, but mainly producing goods that are already established in the 
world market at lower cost. This necessitates tapping into global pool of knowledge and 
diffusion of the imported knowledge in the course of experimentation. According to Jacobsson 
and Bergek (2006) the innovation and diffusion process is an ongoing process of learning, which 
emphasizes the importance of continuous interaction among different actors. It is influenced by 
the actors and market related characteristics, and also by the nature of the institutions and 
networks. Thus, both market ‘failure’ and institutional and network ‘failures’ or weaknesses can 
cause the entire system to fail to develop new activities. Industrial development and the 
associated public policy, therefore, should be approached from a ‘systemic view’. Structural 
transformation, in this context, can be considered as system creation or system transition. 
Similarly, understanding the factors behind the successful emergence of new activities 
requires a systemic– ‘innovation system’ (IS) approach. A system is defined by Freeman 
(1987:1) as “the network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and 
interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies”. The focus of the IS approach 
is on the diffusion of new technology. It enables the identification of the relevant actors (firms 
and other organizations, networks, and institutions) that may block or induce the evolution of 
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new productive activities. Identifying the IS structure and components is not enough, however. 
How these actors function through interacting is equally important. In fact, the focus should be 
on ‘what is actually happening’ as a result of interaction (i.e. the functions) in the IS rather than 
the existence of institutions and stakeholders (Jacobsson, 2005). Just as structural transformation 
requires changes within the wider web of stakeholders—both vertical and horizontal—to 
transform activities from low-value added to higher value, the systemic approach may provide an 
appropriate framework to understand the transition process. 
Several studies (Galli and Teubal, 1997; Bergek, 2002; Edquist, 2004; Jacobson and Bergek, 
2006; Hekkert, Suurs, Negro, Kuhlmann, and Smits, 2007) propose lists of key activities or 
system functions based on empirical case studies of emerging technology in developed countries. 
The common features of these studies are examined and compiled in Begek, Jacobsson, Carlsson, 
Lindmark and Rickne (2008). Their study identifies seven functions crucial for the system 
building process for emerging technology: (1) knowledge development and diffusion; (2) 
entrepreneurial experimentation; (3) influence of the direction of search; (4) market formation; 
(5) legitimation; (6) resource mobilization; and (7) development of positive externalities. These 
are known as ‘functions of innovations systems’ or just ‘functions’. Bergek et al. (2008) argue 
that for IS to evolve and perform well requires these seven functional requirements to be fulfilled. 
They propose that these ‘functions’ can be used as an analytical framework to understand the 
dynamics of emerging new activities and as a policy tool to identify impediments in the system 
to the diffusion of new technology.  
This methodology was introduced for emerging technologies, mainly environmental, in 
developed countries. The emerging technology shares some commonality with emerging 
activities in developing countries as stakeholders face similar degrees of uncertainty and require 
incentives for certain activities/technology to diffuse. Hence, the functions identified within the 
framework, with some modifications, can be applied also to understanding the emergence of new 
activities in developing countries.  
To analyze the emergence of the Ethiopian flower industry systematically, we use the 
‘functional IS framework. There have been some attempts to apply this framework by Jacobsson 
and Bergek (2006) to analyze industry cases in catching-up countries such as, Brazil (steel and 
airplanes), Korea (machinery), and Chile (salmon farming). We build on this work to 
conceptualize the seven key processes (functions) and set the framework in the context of 
 10 
developing countries. In so doing, we complement the ‘functional’ framework by drawing on 
other literatures, including the emerging work on industrial policy. Also, most of the components 
of the functions framework (e.g. experimentation, knowledge diffusion, resource mobilization, 
legitimacy and guiding the search) are identified in Hausmann and Rodrik (2003, 2006), but less 
systematically. Our adapted version of function is explained below. The main questions we 
would like to address in each function are summarized in Table 1. 
 
[Insert TABLE 1] 
 
2.1 Entrepreneurial experimentation 
In a market economy, entrepreneurs occupy a central position in any economic activity. 
Entrepreneurs identify market niches and bear the risks, and transform the potential of new 
knowledge, networks and markets into the concrete actions of creating new products and/or 
processes through new combinations (Hekkert, et al., 2007). An emerging IS evolves under 
considerable uncertainty in terms of technologies, applications and markets. The entrepreneurs, 
who are the risk takers, create dynamic regeneration of the system into new forms through their 
search processes. Entrepreneurial experimentation, therefore, is crucial for a vibrant IS (Bergek, 
et al., 2008).  
 
Entrepreneurial experimentation in catching-up economies, however, tends not to involve the 
emergence of a new product or process, but discovery that a certain good, already well 
established in the world market, can be produced domestically at lower cost, described as ‘cost 
discovery’ (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). Entrepreneurial experimentation involves a range of 
exercises from selecting and importing appropriate technology; adapting it to the local 
environment; producing the right quality; and marketing the new product(s). Success in learning 
is uncertain because (i) of the large element of uncertainty and randomness as to what the 
country might be able to produce well and at lower cost (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006), and (ii) 
catching-up country entrepreneurs enter into the international IS with lower technological 
capabilities and various resource impediments. Private businesses are less willing to take risks in 
developing countries. Provision of rents (e.g. through subsidies or complementary services or 
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products) by governments, therefore, plays a crucial role in stimulating the cost discovery 
process. 
 
2.2 Market formation 
Markets for emerging technologies and products may not exist or may be greatly underdeveloped. 
Hence, market formation for new product involves various phases such as nurturing, bridging 
and maturity. In a catching-up economy, market formation basically means linking to existing 
and established international markets (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2006). Although well-established 
international markets exist for most export products, access is a big challenge for developing 
country firms. First, the required quality for the developed world markets is usually high. 
Producers from developing countries may find it difficult to meet quality requirements due to 
their (i) ‘latecomer’ firm characteristics (i.e. technologically backward) and (ii) the fact that the 
new products for export have not been available in the domestic market. This implies a gap 
between the existing and required knowledge and capabilities for supplying the export market for 
non-traditional products (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004; Kessing and Lall, 1992).  
Second, many developing country exporters face tariff and non-tariff trade barriers in 
entering the international market. Despite recent moves by developed countries to grant 
preferential access to exports from poor countries, the increasingly high standards and power of 
global buyers in the value chain create major challenges for developing countries (Humphrey, 
2006). These developments have major policy implications for the sustainability of new export 
activities and require adoption of national standards, coordinated transport and logistics related 
activities, etc.2  
 
2.3 Knowledge development and diffusion 
According to Hekkert et al. (2007), knowledge development is a fundamental resource in the 
modern economy, and is at the heart of IS and is a pre-requisite for new activities. The 
characteristics of knowledge development in the context of catching-up, however, is not 
development of new knowledge but rather knowledge to access, transfer and master established 
technology in the developed world. Developing country firms need to invest in technological 
                                                 
2
 A detail discussion on change in the governance of the global value chain and the impact on developing countries 
can be found in World Bank (2005), Maertens and Swinnen (2006) and Altenburg (2006). 
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efforts while at the same time taking risks because to acquire, master, adapt and improve existing 
technologies involves significant uncertainties.  
Technological learning does not take place in isolation. It involves a range of actors and 
networks (formal as well as informal). The most important interactions are those involving 
suppliers of inputs or capital goods, competitors, customers, consultants and technology 
suppliers. Linkages can also occur with firms in unrelated industries, technology institutes, 
extension services and universities, industry associations and training institutions (Lall , 2005). 
Technology diffusion is critical to the overall dynamics of the IS in new activities. There are 
different mechanisms through which diffusion takes place such as, training (formal/informal and 
in-house/external), mobility of skilled labor, and clustering. Technology diffusion, however, 
implies major externalities. For example, labor mobility, one of the major mechanism through 
which new technologies and productive capabilities disseminate among firms, involves 
externalities (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006).  
 
2.4 Guiding the direction of search 
The emergence of a new activity may be ‘induced’ by government or be the result of a private 
initiative (i.e. ‘unplanned’). The factors triggering a new activity could be a combination of 
different developments, for example, regulation, crises in current business, technical bottlenecks, 
country endowments, sector development in competing countries. However, the development of 
an IS requires a range of firms and other organizations choosing to enter it (Bergek, et al., 2008).  
New activities are rife with uncertainties and also require complementary inputs. Uncertainty 
and lack of the necessary inputs/services is more critical in a developing country context, which 
may discourage private businesses from investing. Governments in developing countries should 
persuade potential investors, both local and foreign, by boosting the expectations and beliefs 
about the growth potential of a new activity, and demonstrating improvements in governance and 
institutional reforms. Government promotion alone might not be sufficient to generate the 
momentum for change in a specific direction. There must also be provision of adequate 
incentives to share the cost of discovery through factor/product prices (e.g. taxes or input prices). 
Influencing the direction of search should not be limited to governments, but should be an 
interactive and cumulative process involving several stakeholders (Hekkert et al. 2007). 
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Influencing the direction of search is closely related to resource mobilization (function 5) and 
legitimation (function 6).  
 
2.5 Resource mobilization 
Mobilization of a range of resources, such as human capital in the specific field, finance, 
complementary products and services, infrastructure, is needed for a new activity (IS) to develop 
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 2006). Mobilizing these resources for a new activity is not 
straightforward because the complementary inputs and expertise required for the new IS not be 
available in the domestic market. Fund raising might be difficult given the higher uncertainty 
associated with any new activity. Hence, resource mobilization requires the full commitment and 
support of government.  
 
2.6 Legitimation 
According to Bergek et al., (2008) legitimacy is a matter of social acceptance and compliance 
with the relevant institutions. This means the new technology and its proponents need to be 
considered appropriate and desirable by relevant actors, in order for the resources to be 
mobilized, for demand to emerge, and for the actors in the new IS to acquire political strength. 
Legitimacy is not given; it is formed through conscious action which may involve considerable 
time and effort. Jacobsson and Bergek (2006) argue that “The formation of ‘advocacy coalition’ 
sharing a certain vision and the objective of shaping institutional setup forms a key feature of the 
process of structural change influencing this function (i.e. legitimacy)”. The process of 
legitimacy also is often associated with institutional alignment. The relevant institutions to 
support the new activities may not exist initially and may require the development of an 
appropriate institutional framework over time (Bergek et al., 2008). 
Hausmann and Rodrik (2006), pointed out that legitimacy is the principal motivation for 
public-private partnerships in the promotion of a new activity. The relationship between 
government and lobby groups potentially is an excellent source of information, but could also 
facilitate rent-seeking. Hausmann and Rodrik suggest three principles for a shared vision 
involving government and lobby group. (1) Open architecture: whenever possible government 
should not predetermine which sectors or activities it will engage with. (2) Self-organization: 
forcing groups to organize according to some predetermined criteria, e.g. by sector classification, 
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may create groups with few common needs. (3) Transparency: making private sector requests 
public knowledge, and committing to performing independent evaluation of such requests in the 
interests of public benefit. 
 
2.7 Development of positive externalities 
Bergek et al. (2008) argue that the generation of positive external economies is a key process in 
the formation and growth of emerging IS. They propose three reasons why the entry of new 
firms into the emerging IS might be crucial for the development of positive externalities. First, 
new entrants may resolve the initial uncertainties with respect to technology and markets thereby 
strengthening the functions ‘influencing the direction of search’ and ‘market formation’. Second, 
their entry could legitimate the new IS and strengthen the political power of advocacy coalitions. 
Third, the greater the number and variety of the actors in the system, the greater will be the 
chances of new combinations emerging. The development of positive externalities is not 
independent but works through the strengthening of the other six functions. 
 
3. Policy, economic performance and industry background in Ethiopia  
 
3.1. Overview of industrial policy and economic performance 
Following the change of government in 1991, Ethiopia adopted a structural adjustment program 
and began to implement extensive reforms to transform the previous command economy to a 
market oriented one. In the mid-1990s government announced its development vision, known as 
Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI, hereafter). 3  In 1998, it adopted an 
Export Promotion Strategy. This listed priority sectors—such as manufacturing and agro 
industries, which would receive preferential treatment. The flower industry was NOT included in 
the list of priority sectors.  
A comprehensive Industrial Development Strategy (IDS, hereafter) was formulated in 
2002/03. A key element of the IDS is the linkage between industry and agriculture, which is 
based on the broader ADLI. Another core element of the IDS is that sustainable and rapid 
                                                 
3
 ADLI is a development strategy based on a philosophy where agriculture development plays a leading role in the 
industrialization process by providing the conditions for full-fledged industrialization through the supply of inputs to 
the industry sector, generating foreign exchange for importing industrial inputs, and creating markets for industry 
outputs. 
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industrial development can only be ensured if the sector is competitive in the international 
market. Hence, export oriented sectors should lead industrial development and be given 
preferential treatment. Third, the IDS recognizes the role of the private sector as a driver of the 
industrialization process. Fourth, the strategy states the importance of government intervention 
not only as facilitator but also as a leader (i.e., in providing direct support, coordinating and 
guiding the private sector). It cites two important mechanisms by which government could 
engage and promote the private sector; creating a conducive environment and providing direct 
support for selected sectors. The strategy also lists priority sectors for direct government support 
(MoFED, 2006).  
Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world with per capita income of less than 200 
USD (at 2000 constant price); however, its economy has been on a continuous high growth 
trajectory since the drought related contraction in 2002/03 (see Table 2). Between 2004 and 2008, 
GDP grew by an annual average of 11.8 percent. The long-term pattern for the structure of the 
economy shows an increasing share of the service sector and a still small (even by sub-Saharan 
Africa standards) industry base.  
Ethiopia’s export structure has barely changed since the 1990s, and is based mainly on 
agricultural products (e.g., food accounted for some 61 percent of total exports in 2007). 
However, there has been significant growth in exports earnings averaging 24 percent in the 
period 2004-2008 (National Bank of Ethiopia – NBE, 2007/08). Ethiopia’s pattern of exports in 
the last five years demonstrates that the growth is based mainly on agricultural products, from 
diversification to non-traditional exports and intensification of traditional goods. According to 
the NBE 2007/08 annual report, cut flowers, pulses, live animals, and oil seeds are among the 
high performers with (444%), (101%), (73%) and (25%) annual growth respectively The cut 
flower industry is a particularly successful diversification for Ethiopia.  
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
3.2. The Ethiopian flower industry 
Ethiopia is endowed with the conditions required for a successful flower industry (i.e., flat 
land at high altitudes, a cool climate, low cost labor, proximity to major markets, and an 
international airport near to the production areas). Ethiopia (like Ecuador) is regarded as 
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especially suited to the production of high quality, T-hybrid roses (Reinders, 2008). In the early 
1980s there was brief effort made by the state farms to produce and export summer flowers to 
Europe. The potential and basic know-how related to flower growing existed but was not well 
utilized until quite recently. 
Initial attempts to establish a flower industry emerged in the mid 1990s and the sector 
flourished in the early 2000s with large-scale export of cut-flowers. Figure 1 depicts the number 
of new entrants, the cumulative population of firms, and export value in USD by years for 2000-
2008. In 2003, only five farms were engaged in the production and export of flowers. The post-
2003 period is characterized by high entry of firms and spectacular growth in exports. Annual 
average growth in number of firms and exports in 2003 to 2008 is around 380% and 638% 
respectively.  
 
[Insert figure 1] 
 
In 2008, there were 81 flower farms employing around 50,000 workers (over 70% women). 
Ethiopia’s flower exports reached 100 million USD and the industry is one of the top four 
sources of foreign exchange for the country. In less than a decade of experience, Ethiopia ranks 
second in Africa for flower exports (after Kenya) and fifth in Extra-EU exporters to the EU 
market (Table 3).  
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
4. Mapping the functional patterns of the Ethiopian flower industry 
In this section we employ the seven key functions to highlight the flower industry discovery 
process and the factors that have contributed to the success of the flower export sector in 
Ethiopia. Based on the earlier description of flower industry, each function is explained in terms 
of this specific context.  
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4.1. Entrepreneurial experimentation: iterative learning process 
(4.1.1) First movers 
Meskel Flowers Plc. was the first private company to engage in export oriented commercial 
flower farming in Ethiopia. The farm in Meki, 160 kms south of the capital city, Addis Ababa, 
began operations in 1993. A second private farm, Ethio-Flora, was established (in Zeway, 98 
kms south of Addis Ababa) soon after. Both farms are Ethiopian owned and produce summer 
flowers (field produced) such as alliums, statice, and carnations for export to EU markets. 
Initially, the farms recruited domestic expertise mainly former state owned flower farm 
employees. But Meskel Flower recruited a production manager from Kenya. Both farms received 
support from the EU, to employ consultants for a period from Kenya and the UK. 
Learning took place gradually, and the first entrant (Meskel Flower) made a move in 1999 to 
begin rose production. It started production using wooden greenhouses despite steel based 
greenhouse technology being mature and available in the international market. In 1996, the EU 
financed a half-hectare summer flower (carnation) demonstration with Ethio-Flora in Zeway. In 
1996, neither of the farms was receiving specific support from the Ethiopian government. Both 
farms were unable to continue to export flowers, but for different reasons. Meskel Flower ceased 
production and export following the arrest of its owner in 2001,4 While Ethio-Flora shifted 
production to vegetables only.5 Despite their early exit, these farms contributed to the initial 
accumulation of flower industry knowledge in Ethiopia and the feasibility for Golden Rose, a 
new entrant, relied on the experience of these farms.   
 
(4.1.2) The pioneer – Golden Rose 
In 1999, Golden Rose Agrofarms Ltd. (Golden Rose, hereafter) – a foreign owned firm – started 
rose production using steel structure greenhouses, 42 kms South West of Addis Ababa. Although 
the pioneers (Meskel Flower and Ethio-Flora) had laid the foundations for the flower industry 
growing summer flowers, Golden Rose is considered to be the pioneer by many followers due to 
its introduction of modern technology (e.g. steel structure greenhouses).  
                                                 
4
 After his release in 2005 the owner launched another flower farm business under the same name but on farm land 
leased from Sher-Ethiopia in Zeway. 
5
 The owner of Ethio Flora, Ato Tsegaye Abebe, started a new rose farm (a joint venture with a Dutch partner) in 
2005, under the name Ethio Highlands and in another location. He is founder and currently Chairman of the 
Horticulture Industry Association. 
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Golden Rose is a subsidiary of RINA Investment, an Indian family business, based in the UK. 
Before entering Ethiopia, the mother company was involved in several business activities (e.g. 
textile, property, ostrich farming, and flour mills) in a number of countries including Uganda, 
Kenya, and Rwanda in Africa. Initially, the company’s interest to enter Ethiopia was to purchase 
privatized state firms. The bid for the state owned Saint George brewery was not successful and 
the company had to look for other business opportunities. It hired a consultant which produced a 
promising feasibility study on rose flower farms. Based on this the company decided to establish 
a rose farm in Ethiopia. However, neither the mother company nor the managing director of 
Golden Rose had any experience in flower farming. How did Golden Rose overcome the initial 
difficulties in acquiring the technology and skilled labor and penetrating the global market? 
 Golden Rose relied on imported equipment and knowledge to start its flower business. It 
entered into a turnkey arrangement with an Israeli consulting company. The consulting firm 
constructed all the farm facilities (including the green-houses, irrigation facilities, cold-rooms, 
etc.) and planted the roses. It provided a farm manager for the initial stage. Due to the lack of 
domestic human resources, Golden Rose recruited two Indian expatriates to support the farm 
manager put in by the consultant, and began to train up Ethiopian workers. The company 
(management and workers) experienced a major learning curve.6 On the farm, only the three 
experts knew about rose growing. At first, the company has almost 50% of its production 
rejected for export based on poor quality and bad handling. It continued to provide training to its 
workers and middle managers to improve their skills. However, the company was also faced with 
high turnover of workers after they acquired these new skills. This problem became critical with 
the entry of new firms in the take-off period. By 2004 the company had lost nearly all the staff it 
had trained to new firms and was forced continuously to adjust wages in order to retain what 
skilled labor remained. 
 Golden Rose began exporting in 2000 through Dutch auction. According to the managing 
director the price was initially acceptable. However, after a few months (around July 2000) the 
auction price declined. Moreover, the firm was subject to a large hidden (service) charge (around 
20- 25% of the price obtained according to the manager), which it did not expect and could not 
control. Consequently, the company started to receive negative returns. According to the 
                                                 
6
 The information on Golden Rose presented in this part is based on an interview with Mr. Ryaz Shamji, its founder 
and managing director.   
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manager “that was a completely confusing and challenging moment.” Since then Golden Rose 
has searched for direct sales opportunities and abandoned the auction route.      
 
BOX 1: Pioneer firm, Golden Rose  
Golden Rose is not only a pioneer but also one of the most successful and most diversified firms in the 
sector. It continuously expanded up to 2007/08 and showed rapid growth - employment grew from 115 
to about 900, production surface area from 7 hectares to 22.5 hectares, and flower value chains were 
expanded through the acquisition of trading licenses to import equipment, chemicals and fertilizers 
(2003), establish a carton box factory (2004) and establish propagation  facilities (2006).   
 
(4.1.3) Early imitators and diffusion of knowledge 
Following the entry of Golden Rose, four other rose farms (Summit Agro industry, Ethio Dreams, 
SIET Agro PLC, and Eniy Ethio Rose) entered the industry between 2001 and 2003. Three out of 
the four new entrants were domestic owned. Most of the owners of these farms had migrated 
from another line of business in an attempt to diversify and had no prior experience in flower 
farming. According to Golden Rose’s manager, unlike the late comers (i.e. after 2003), these 
early followers did not try to steal skilled workers from the pioneer. Rather, the early followers 
had very close and cooperative relationships with Golden Rose farm. They learned from its 
experience through frequent visits to the farm and discussions with management. The 
cooperation included sharing of equipment (e.g. trucks), storage facilities (cold storage), and 
skilled employees.  
The early followers imitated some Golden Rose’s production and marketing methods. Like 
Golden Rose, the early followers produced and exported roses. All imported equipment for the 
construction of physical infrastructure (greenhouses, irrigation systems) came mainly from Israel 
and the Netherlands. They also relied on international breeders through licensed royalties, as the 
main sources of new varieties.  
 
(4.1.4) Take-off and flow of foreign investors 
The sequence of entry of firms in the Ethiopian flower industry shows that domestic 
entrepreneurs played a major role in the initial stages. With the exception of Golden Rose and 
Ethio Dream, the first movers and early imitators were domestic owned firms. Foreign firms (in 
the form of joint-venture or full ownership) started to enter mostly after 2003, a period marked 
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by high entry and export growth. The majority (four out five) of the 2004 new entrants were 
foreign owned (two fully foreign owned, two joint ventures with 99% and with 50% foreign 
shares). Of the 21 farms that started production in 2005, 11 were fully domestic owned and only 
4 fully foreign owned. But five out of the six joint ventures have 50% and above share of foreign 
ownership. In 2006 and 2007, the entry of foreign owned firms surpassed the entry of domestic 
firms, 11 to 4 and 10 to 4 respectively. Moreover, the seven joint ventures registered in 2006 had 
75% and above foreign share.  
A significant number of the foreign firms came from other African countries, including 
Kenya (e.g. Linsen, Abyssinia, Maranque, Karuturi, and Sher-Ethiopia), Uganda and Zimbabwe.  
The better investment climate in Ethiopia compared to these countries may have contributed to 
the increasing shift of foreign investment to Ethiopia. According to our survey, 33% and 23% 
foreign owned farms rated climate and government supporting policies respectively as the major 
reason for investment in the flower industry in Ethiopia.  
The large flow of foreign owned firms helped to ‘scale-up’ the Ethiopian flower industry in 
terms of both export quantity and firm population and also diversification of activities and 
transfer of knowledge. This is exemplified by the fact that all the eight summer flower farms and 
five cuttings farms are fully foreign owned or are joint ventures with higher foreign shares. The 
case of Sher-Ethiopia, a subsidiary of Sher-Holland – the biggest flower producer in the world, is 
an example of the role of foreign firms in stimulating the sector and particularly the transfer of 
technology and marketing knowledge (see, Box 2).  
The entrepreneurial experimentation went through several phases. In the formative phase, as 
demonstrated by the case of Golden Rose, the early pioneering firms achieved successful 
learning and adjusted to the environment, allowing them to establish a new activity through the 
acquisition of knowledge in the form of embodied capital, they achieved market penetration by 
shifting from the auction market to contract buyers, and solved the problem of lack of resources 
both human and financial. In the high growth period, the industry received support from 
government and the extra boost from foreign direct investment. All this allowed them to 
mobilize their resources effectively to diffuse knowledge and to scale up activities which 
involved cooperation for example in the form of shared use of infrastructures which created 
creating positive externalities. 
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BOX 2 Sher-Ethiopia 
The entry of Sher-Ethiopia in 2005 was a landmark in the Ethiopian flower industry growth. The 
company had been engaged in flower farming business in Kenya for over 15 years with production on 300 ha 
of farming land (Africa News, 2008). In 2007, it sold its Kenyan farm and moved to Ethiopia to become the 
largest investor in the sector. It leased about 500 ha of land from the government in an area about 170 km 
from Addis Ababa (known as Zeway) near the highway between Addis Ababa and Nairobi.  
Sher-Ethiopia is not only the largest farm but is well known for its unique business scheme. It developed all 
initial infrastructural investments (including construction of greenhouses, irrigation systems, packing sheds, 
cold rooms and other facilities, installation of machines and flower plantations) in the land acquired from 
government and leased them to other private investors. It provides packets of 10 ha and over, to interested 
businesses on lease arrangements. Ownership is transferred to the lessee after 105 months (just less than 9 
years). As of 2008, there were 9 companies – four local and five foreign –operating under this leasing 
scheme. In addition to leasing, Sher-Ethiopia supplies seed to nine farms, and handles their exports under the 
trade mark Afri Flora, and provides training and consultancy (Addis Fortune, 2008). This arrangement makes it 
possible for growers to start immediately on a reasonable scale, without having to take on a major financial 
and technological risk.  
 
4.2. Legitimation: creation of a shared vision through private-public partnership   
In the early experimentation stages, entrepreneurs encountered various obstacles. A critical 
problem for exporters in this stage was lack of reliable and cheap air cargo. For example, in the 
early years, air cargo space was only available on passenger flights operated by Ethiopian 
Airlines (EAL) and Lufthansa. Availability of finance was another problem since the flower 
industry is capital intensive and start-up investment involved considerable fixed assets. Prior to 
2003, private investors in the flower sector were mainly forced to obtain land by leasing it from 
small farmers. This was a slow process that required consolidation of several small contiguous 
holdings. Even when government offered land to investors on a lease basis the bureaucratic 
procedures involved were cumbersome.  
To try to address these and other problems, the entrepreneurs confronted government with 
the potential success and profitability of the flower industry and the opportunity it represented 
for the country. They organized themselves to form an association, the Ethiopia Horticulture 
Producers and Exporters Association (EHPEA, the association, hereafter) established in 
September 2002 with five members. The association currently has more than 86 members of 
which about 81 are flower producers/exporters.  
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The association has been instrumental in the development of the sector since its 
establishment and has acted as a ‘pathfinder’. One of its early activities was to lobby government 
for privileges to be granted to the sector. The association has been highly successful in raising 
awareness in government about the opportunity represented by the sector and for its harmonious 
operation. For example, the Chairman of EHPEA was involved in preparing the first five-year 
government plan of action for the sector.  
With government help, the association began to address a wider audience that included 
buyers, NGOs, and the public. The association has been involved in developing informal 
networks with donors and organizing various forums such as international trade fairs. As a result, 
it has created strong connections with the donor community and secured wide support for the 
sector. Donors include the UK DFID, the French Development Cooperation, USAID, and the 
Dutch government. The relationship with the Netherlands is particularly visible. The association 
received wide support from the Dutch government within the project ‘Ethiopian-Netherlands 
Horticulture Partnership’. Different Dutch institutions such as the Dutch Center for the 
Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries (CBI) and Wagningen University are helping 
with capacity building. The association, therefore, has been crucial for building a shared vision 
among the various stakeholders through its interactions. 
The association organized three international trade fairs in Addis Ababa, in 2005, 2007, and 
in March 2009. More than 130 companies (mostly foreign companies) related to the floriculture 
sector (flower growers, breeders, fertilizer and chemicals traders, greenhouse and irrigation 
system constructors, refrigeration installation companies, etc.) participated in the last two 
exhibitions which was supported by government. The 2009 exhibition was opened with remarks 
from the Prime Minister, who exhibitors were invited to meet (Afrik.com, 2009).     
Another important step in the legitimacy process was the adoption in 2007 of a code of 
conduct for the sector. The association, government, and donors played important roles in this. 
Adoption of international standards in this code of conduct has helped to promote the image of 
the Ethiopian flower industry in the international market and address concerns among civil 
society in Ethiopia about the environmental impact of flower farms. 
The success of this new activity, therefore, was enabled by a combination of the collection of 
separate efforts through entrepreneurial experimentation and also collective action by the various 
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stakeholders—public sector and civil society—towards a shared vision promoted by EHPEA as 
the ‘pathfinder’, to legitimize the trajectory of its development. 
 
4.3.  Resource mobilization and influencing the direction of search 
Prior to 2003, there were few programs specifically targeting the flower industry. The export 
promotion strategy adopted in 1998 made no mention of the flower industry. Although the 
flower industry might have benefited from this broad export promotion support scheme, take-off 
did not occur until industry specific support was provided by government.7  
 By the end of 2002, government realized the opportunity offered by the flower industry to 
earn sizeable amounts of foreign exchange. Ethiopia was able to enter the top end of the flower 
market because the quality of its cut roses compared with the best in the world (Ecuador and 
Colombia). Government decided therefore to actively engage in promoting the sector in terms of 
resource mobilization and coordination. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) requested the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI) to propose a five-year action plan for the sector, outlining 
constraints and possible solutions. Based on the MoTI report, targets were set to put 1,000 
hectares under flower production after five years, based on the record of Kenya’s output and 
export earnings. At the end of 2002, the area under glass was less than 30 hectares. To scale up 
from this base, government came in with multi-faceted support starting in 2003, focusing 
particularly on access to land, access to long-term credit, infrastructure and air transport 
coordination.  
After the government decision to support the sector, land held by government was made 
available for flower farms near to the airport in Addis Ababa, at very cheap prices of under 20 
USD per annum per hectare. Table 4 reports the sources of land and average duration of tenure. 
The majority of those surveyed (83%) indicated that their land was government leased. Land 
lease payments were fixed over an extended period of, on average, 21.5 years. This helped to 
reduce the financial burden for investors and made entry easier. The average tenure period is 
27.5 years and the maximum 90 years. Provision of this land at low prices and with longer tenure 
periods would not have been possible without the release of government land. 
 
                                                 
7
 The promotion scheme for export includes 100% exemption from duties on imports of capital goods and raw 
materials necessary for the production of export goods, exemption from export tax and tax on transfer of shares of 
assets, and tax holidays on profits for 5 years. 
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[Insert Table 4] 
  
Government also provided long-term credit on very generous terms through the Development 
Bank of Ethiopia. Investors can borrow up to 70:30 debt-equity ratio with no collateral 
requirement. Interest rates are low and do not vary much. According to our survey, 75% of farms 
have a bank term loan and 45% of them reported borrowing from DBE for their initial 
investment. The majority of farms (62.5%) indicated that firm equity or a project was the only 
collateral required for a bank loan (see, Table 4).  
Compared to other major horticultural exporter countries in Africa, government support in 
Ethiopia is clearly very favorable. For example, the fixed interest rate (around 7.5%) is very low 
compared to many other African countries’ interest rates which are generally around 15%. The 
real interest rate that Ethiopian exporters have been required to pay since 2005 is zero when 
calculated against the growing rate of inflation in Ethiopia. This translates into a pure resource 
transfer (subsidy) to exporters.  
Government has also played an important role in resolving the air transport problem. It 
initiated discussion and cooperation between the exporters and Ethiopian Airlines (EAL) with 
the result that the majority (87%) of flower farm enterprises use this airline (see, Table 4). EAL 
supports the flower industry by leasing cargo planes. The airline also in 2008 relocated its cargo 
handling activities from Amsterdam to Brussels and to Liege Airports in Belgium, running 6 to 
10 daytime flights weekly, to transport flowers to the major flower auctions (Liege Airport press 
release, 2008).  
Other foreign carriers, such as, KLM, Lufthansa, Etihad, and Emirates, have begun to carry 
flowers from Ethiopia and exporters are working to open up the air freight market. They claim 
that unlike the situation in Kenya, the airfreight market in Ethiopia is overregulated based on the 
concerns of the authorities over foreign exchange.  
As well as mobilizing resources, government is involved in advocacy to attract domestic and 
foreign investors. Its strong commitment to this start is demonstrated by the involvement of the 
top officials, including the Prime Minister through his position as the chair of the National 
Export Promotion Committee, and frequent interaction with the sector entrepreneurs directly and 
through their association.  
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Over time, other forms of engagements such as regulation (e.g., Industry Code of Conduct, 
foreign exchange use, diversification of location, and the environment) have been initiated. 
Government has been engaged also in upgrading and formalizing the institutions responsible for 
the sector. Until recently, MoTI dealt with the private sector in the flower industry. In 2002, it 
established a Horticulture Development Team which, in 2008, was upgraded to agency level and 
named the Ethiopian Horticulture Development Agency (EHAD), under the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (MoRAD), with the objective of further strengthening and 
formalizing support for the sector.  
 
4.4.  Knowledge transfer and diffusion: interactive learning process 
The main source of technology for the development of the flower industry is foreign. 
Technology transfer occurs mainly through private acquisitions, i.e. equipment purchase and 
plants (new varieties) licensed from international companies. In the initial period, there was 
acute shortage of skilled manpower specialized in flower production and marketing, in the 
domestic market. Hence, most early entrant farms hired expatriates particularly from neighboring 
Kenya.  
 Turnover of skilled workers became one of the main channels for the diffusion of knowledge. 
Poaching of experienced workers increased with the accumulation of some knowledge among 
the early movers and increased new entry. As already discussed, Golden Rose suffered from very 
high turnover of trained employees particularly following the influx of new firms in 2004, and 
was forced continuously to adjust its wages in a bid to retain its skilled labor. As the sector 
expanded, the pool of domestic expertise has increased and the market for skilled labor has 
stabilized. There is a greater availability of experienced people on the flower farms. Table 5 
reports the percentage of expertise from other domestic flower farms in initial production, by 
year of entry. From the eight farms that started production before 2005, only one reported using 
Ethiopian managers or supervisors recruited from other flower farms in Ethiopia. However, 
among those firms that started production after 2005 recruitment from other Ethiopian farms for 
managers and supervisors is much higher. For example, among the 15 new entrants in 2006, 11 
reported recruiting managers and supervisors for their initial production from other domestic 
flower farms. And in 2007, among the 12 new entrants, 8 reported recruiting Ethiopian managers 
or supervisors for their start up phase.    
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[Insert Table 5] 
 
Another important mechanism of knowledge diffusion and learning is in-house and external 
training. According to our survey, the majority of farms provide (in house and external) short-
term training for production workers and agro-specialists. For example, in 2007, 52 (81%) of 
flower farms provided in-house training for their production workers and the percentage that 
were given training in total production workers was 70%. Some 31 farms indicated that in the 
same year, they sent about 11% of their production workers for outside training. Also, half of the 
farms offered in-house and external training to their agro-specialists in 2007. The average 
percentage of agro-specialists that participated in this training was 72% for in-house training and 
49% for outside training.  
The association plays a significant role in organizing external training courses for workers 
and managers from member farms. The training programs include post-harvest handling and cool 
chain; safe use and storage of pesticides; and strategies to secure competitive advantage in flower 
industry. Some of this training is provided by international experts from the Dutch CBI and other 
reputable institutions. The association organizes certificate and training programs related to the 
sector Code of Conduct. 
As the sector expands, the supply of industry specialists becomes more critical. Government 
with the support of the Dutch government has started to consolidate higher education in 
horticulture. One of the state universities, Jimma University, has begun to offer diplomas (BSc 
and MSc) in floriculture. Efforts are also underway to establish a Horticulture Practical Training 
Center (HPTC) within the Ethiopian-Netherlands Partnership on Horticulture.  
So far, there are no links with the national agricultural research organization (EARO) on the 
development of new varieties. Thus, the sector may have to continue to rely on international 
breeders for sourcing suitable rose varieties and conducting adaptive trials in the medium and 
even longer term. 
 
4.5.  Market formation 
There are markets for flowers across the developed world, hence, in the early stage, the problem 
was mainly to link to the existing market. For Ethiopia – and for all of Africa - the major flower 
export destination is the EU. Cut flowers are sold via the auction markets (mainly Dutch 
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auctions) and/or directly to supermarkets and other retailers. Relative ease of access to the 
auction market means new entrants tend to begin by using this channel. The main barrier to the 
European market in the early stage was the cost and the poor availability of air cargo space. 
Government efforts to coordinate transport with the EAL largely resolved this problem.       
Access to the EU market has become more difficult due to new rules and standards. To 
respond to these, in 2006, the Ethiopian flower association developed its own code of conduct 
which was implemented in 2007. During its development, 20 farms joined a pilot training 
program and 10 farms received certification in 2009.  
Over time, the sector has become more diversified in terms of market channels and 
destinations. In 2007, 41 farms reported involvement in direct sales. Table 6 shows the top 
market destinations for Ethiopian flowers. The number of destinations has increased from 2-3 
countries (all in Europe) in the early 2000s, to some 56 worldwide in 2008. There are 14 
destination countries with USD 100,000 and over export value. The EU is still the major 
destination accounting for around 94.5% of total export value with the Netherlands (88%) in the 
lead. 
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
The association continues to play an important role in expanding the market. The association 
members visit or received visitors from potential buyer countries in Europe, the Middle East and 
Japan. Currently, they are keen to expand business links with the Dubai Flower Centre (DFC) 
because of its geographical and logistical advantages which would boost their supplies to the 
Middle East and the Far East.  
 
4.6.  Development of positive externalities 
The sources of positive externalities in the evolution of new activities are widespread. For 
example, the entry of pioneers into the business was crucial for smoothing the way for followers. 
This was discussed in section 4.1 in relation to the entry process. Stabilization of the market for 
skilled labor is another positive externality that has come with sector expansion. This was 
discussed in section 4.4 under knowledge transfer and diffusion. Here, we concentrate on the 
positive externalities arising from the diversification of activities. 
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 With the expansion of the sector, complementary activities, such as propagation of planting 
materials, packaging, fertilizers and chemicals supplies, and forwarding companies, started to 
emerge. By early 2008, there were six cuttings companies, all European in origin, producing pot 
plants and cut flower cuttings for export. The cuttings farms also propagate new varieties for the 
domestic market. A number of rose farms have begun to propagate for their own use and for the 
domestic market. Thus, the source of plant materials is slowing shifting from imports to local 
supply. There is an increasing trend for imported fertilizers and chemicals to be substituted by 
local production, and the majority of farms (96%) use locally produced packaging materials.  
 So far, the emergence of Ethiopian flower industry has been explained within the framework 
of the IS. As mentioned by Bergek et al. (2008), the functions of the IS are not independent but 
overlap as interactions evolve among stakeholders. The case of the Ethiopian flower industry 
demonstrates the difficulties involved in separating functions. The analysis in this paper shows 
the provision of a framework of functions makes it easier to identify what is happening in the 
systemic context to facilitate effective policy formulation. 
 
5. Summary and concluding remarks 
This paper has examined the evolution of the Ethiopian flower industry as an example of 
successful non-traditional natural resource based export activities in developing countries. We 
applied the ‘functional IS’ framework to a catching-up country context to conduct an ex-post 
analysis on the evolution of a new activity. We find this framework to be a useful policy tool to 
map the dynamics of interaction among the various actors in the discovery process and 
formulation of tasks. The framework enabled the identification of a particular sequence of the 
seven functions in a catching-up country. The main findings are summarized below.  
The trigger factors for the emergence of the flower industry in Ethiopia included the 
combination of several factors. Natural endowment and generous government incentives for all 
export activities created favourable conditions compared to neighbouring flower exporting 
countries (e.g. Kenya, Zimbabwe and Uganda). However, without ‘entrepreneurial 
experimentation’, the industry could not have become established. The flower industry was not 
among the government’s initial priority list of export activities. Thus, ‘entrepreneurial 
experimentation’ by private entrepreneurs was the first critical step in the ‘discovery’ of the 
sector. The role of these early entrants was important for reducing uncertainties for fellow 
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investors (‘positive externality’) and for making government aware of this alternative policy 
option.  
One characteristic of the early stage in a new activity is the prevalence of huge uncertainty in 
technology, markets and infrastructure. ‘Legitmation’ and ‘resource mobilization’ were badly 
needed by the early entrants. Following advocacy activity by the entrepreneurs, government 
began to provide support and launched a strategy to ‘guide the direction of search’. It established 
a five-year target and identified three key areas of intervention: provision of long-term credit; 
provision of land;, and coordination of air transport. The government intervention in terms of 
improving ‘legitimation’, ‘resource mobilization’ and ‘guidance’ was the crucial next step. It 
helped to reduce the uncertainties surrounding the early entrants and created the conditions for 
the industry to expand.  
 ‘Market formation’ was relatively less challenging in the formative phase where the main 
task was to link into the existing international market and search for a market niche, mainly 
through auctions in the Netherlands. The growth period required some market formation for the 
producers to stay in the market for a sustained period. To improve the reputation of the industry 
in the world market, the association focused strongly on quality control and developed an 
industry Code of Conduct. The association also contributed by diversifying and expanding 
market destinations. In this regard, the private sector took the lead role through the association 
while government played supportive role.   
The flower sector had to rely on international purchase to acquire the necessary ‘technology 
and expertise’ for production and marketing, particularly in the initial stage. Foreign direct 
investment played an important role in knowledge transfer and diffusion. Training and turnover 
of skilled workers were the main channels of the ‘knowledge diffusion’ in the sector. In the later 
stage, the association and government supported human capacity building with the former 
organizing short courses, and the latter consolidating higher education in horticulture. There is a 
lack of local research/university linkages for knowledge creation and the sector is dependent on 
international breeders for plant stock. 
This study shows that the presence of a ‘pathfinder’ institution, in this case the association, to 
consistently pursue development of the sector and coordinate activities is crucial. The association 
has played a critical role in the success of the Ethiopian flower industry. Its activities cover a 
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wide spectrum including lobbying government, standards setting, collective market search, 
developing the capacity of members, promoting and legitimation of the sector.  
It shows also that collaboration between government and the private sector is required for 
sector building. The private entrepreneurs ‘discovered’ that flowers could be produced and 
exported profitably. They formed the association in an effort to build a strong ‘advocacy 
coalition’ and were able to convince the government about the opportunity offered by the sector. 
Government recognized the opportunity and potential and added cut flower production to its 
priority list. It began by inviting the association representatives to participate in the preparation 
of the first-five-year action plan for the sector outlining constraints and possible solutions. The 
association and government achieved consensus and a shared vision of sector development, 
which further improved legitimacy.  
This is consistent with Rodrik’s (2004) view that: “The right model for industrial policy is 
not that of an autonomous government applying Pigovian taxes or subsidies, but of strategic 
collaboration between the private sector and the government with the aim of uncovering where 
the most significant obstacles to restructuring lie and what type of interventions are more likely 
to remove them is critical.”   
Finally, the context and relative importance of the functions differ by the stage of 
development of the sector. For example, ‘legitimation’ in the initial stage was mainly targeted at 
acquiring government support, but in the later stages focused on the wider audience. ‘Market 
formation’ was not a huge challenge in the early stage but become crucial in the growth stage. 
Correspondingly, the role of government changed through the different phases of sector 
development. In the early stage government played a developmental role by providing inputs and 
sharing costs (e.g., finance, land, and transport coordination). In the growth stage, other forms of 
engagement such as an increasing regulatory role, capacity building, formalization of 
interactions, and strengthening of institutions is required. This suggests that successful policies 
must be context specific and may differ by country and sector/activity and also by stage of 
development of the activity. This reinforces the importance of dynamic policy and ability of 
policy makers to react quickly to the needs of the private sector.  
Structural transformation is crucial for developing countries. Due to the globalization of 
economy, the export sector can create a space for learning through interaction with various 
external stakeholders; however, the process of learning is not automatic. The timing is crucial as 
 31 
is the identification of solutions. Formulating and identifying the appropriate policy ex-ante is 
difficult. The example of Ethiopian flower industry demonstrates that the functions of the IS 
framework can support this policy formulation process by providing guidelines to enable the 
search for the right solutions by identifying the actors, functions and impediments in the wider, 
‘systemic’ context. 
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Figure 1: Pattern of firm entry and exports in the Ethiopian flower industry  
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Sources: exports figures are found from UN-Comtrade and the rest own survey  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 37 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of the functions issues to be raised under each heading 
 
Functions In developing countries In this function we assess 
Entrepreneurial 
experimentation  
 
entrepreneurial 
experimentation is 
likely to be the first and 
critical step in 
‘discovery’ process  
o Who are the first movers and what was their 
motivation to enter the industry?  
o What challenges did the pioneers encountered at the 
initial stage and how were these problems solved?  
o Who are the early followers and how did knowledge 
diffuse from pioneer to followers?  
o What was the role of different actors at the initial 
stage?  
o And how did the sector evolve in terms of number of 
entrants, export patterns, and diversified activities? 
Market formation basically linking to 
existing and established 
international markets 
o the link to international markets and market 
diversification efforts, 
o development of code of conduct of the industry to 
improve access, 
o government and other stakeholders supports in market 
formation 
Knowledge 
development and 
diffusion 
 
mainly to access, 
transfer and master 
established technology 
in the developed world 
– imitation 
o role of different source of technology (e.g. FDI, 
licensing, acquisition) and networks and 
interactions with input suppliers and product 
buyers,  
o market for skilled labor (foreign expertise versus 
domestic availability) 
o labor turnover, training (in-house and external),  
o strengthening higher education (a long term 
perspective) 
Guiding the 
direction of 
search 
New activities are full 
of uncertainty and also 
require complementary 
inputs and services - 
more critical in 
developing countries. 
o What triggered the emergence of the sector (country 
investment climate and external factors)?  
o Is the sector a government induced or discovery of 
private experiment?  
o What package of incentives was provided by the 
government to guide the search?  
Legitimatization It is a matter of social 
acceptance, compliance 
with relevant 
institutions and 
concerns the principal 
motivation behind 
public-private 
partnerships 
o advocacy activity  
o synergy between government, association, and other 
stakeholders  
o Institutional alignment (co-evolution of industry 
association and government institutions) 
o effort to comply with international standards 
Resource 
mobilization 
for a new activity to 
develop mobilization of 
a range of resources is 
needed  
o how some of these key resources (e.g. land, finance, 
and human capital) were mobilized and  
o what the role of the government was in this process 
Development of 
positive 
externalities 
Entry of new firms into 
the emerging SIS is 
central to the 
development of positive 
externalities 
o development of complementary activities (specialized 
intermediate goods and services providers) 
o labor markets  
o expansion of the sector and formation of new 
coalitions 
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Table 2: Aggregate indicators of Ethiopian economic performance  
 
 
1991 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 
2004-08 
(avg.) 
GDP per capita (constant 2000 
US$) 116 115 125 150 162 175 190 .. 
GDP growth (annual %) 
-7 6 6 12 11 11 11 11.8 
Agriculture, value added (% of 
GDP) 64 57 50 47 48 46 43 .. 
Agriculture, value added 
(annual % growth) 3 4 3 14 11 9 8 11.8 
Services, etc., value added (% 
of GDP) 27 33 38 40 39 40 45 .. 
Services, etc., value added 
(annual % growth) -15 9 10 13 13 14 16 12.4 
Industry, value added (% of 
GDP) 9 10 12 13 13 13 13 .. 
Industry, value added (annual % 
growth) -23 8 5 9 10 11 10 10.4 
Manufacturing, value added (% 
of GDP) 3 5 6 5 5 5 5 .. 
Manufacturing, value added 
(annual % growth) -40 10 7 13 11 10 9 10.0 
Food exports (% of merchandise 
exports) .. 73 67 75 72 61 .. .. 
Manufactures exports (% of 
merchandise exports) .. 11 9 4 5 13 .. .. 
Source: World Bank (2010) World Development Indicator (WDI), online source.  
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39 
 
Table 3: Top 10 cut-flower exporters into the EU market 2001-2007 
 
2001 2003 2007 
country 
share in 
EU 
market Rank country 
share in 
EU 
market Rank country 
share in 
EU 
market Rank 
Kenya 25.90 1 Kenya 31.71 1 Kenya 39 1 
Israel 18.35 2 Colombia 15.15 2 Colombia 14.17 2 
Colombia 15.40 3 Israel 14.08 3 Ecuador 13.6 3 
Ecuador 12.10 4 Ecuador 11.15 4 Israel 8.94 4 
Zimbabwe 10.04 5 Zimbabwe 8.69 5 Ethiopia 5.05 5 
Thailand 2.84 6 Thailand 2.71 6 Zimbabwe 2.82 6 
Zambia 2.67 7 Uganda 2.66 7 Uganda 2.56 7 
Uganda 1.87 8 Zambia 2.61 8 Thailand 2.52 8 
South 
Africa 1.60 9 
South 
Africa 2.24 9 Zambia 1.96 9 
Tanzania 1.45 10 Turkey 1.67 10 
South 
Africa 1.62 10 
         
Ethiopia 0.14 24 Ethiopia 0.50 15    
Source: UN comtrade, but own calculation 
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Table 4: Source of land and means of transport and credit 
 
How did this enterprise obtain land when started business?  Frequency % 
Government 53 82.9 
private/farmers 11 17.2 
Total                                64 100 
   
 Mean Maximum 
Length of the lease period of the current contract? (Years) 27.5 90 
Over how long do you expect to pay the total cost? (Years) 21.5 85 
   
Do you have a term loan from a bank or financial institution? Frequency % 
Yes 48 75 
No 16 25 
Total 64 100 
 
  
What was the required collateral for your loan? 
  
Land 4 8.3 
Buildings 6 12.5 
Machinery & equipment 8 16.7 
Firm equity/project 29 62.5 
Total 48 100 
 
  
Air liner often used in exporting your flowers   
Ethiopian 55 87.3 
Lufthansa 1 1.6 
Emirates 5 7.9 
KLM 1 1.6 
Ethiopian, Emirates, & KLM 1 1.6 
Source: own survey 
 
 
Table 5: expertise from other domestic flower company at initial production year 
 
 Number of firms by year of start of production  
% managers and supervisors coming 
from other domestic flower company at 
initial production year 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
0  1   3 3 16 4 4 
greater than zero  0 1 0 0 3 11 8 
20% and above  0 0 0 0 2 8 6 
40% and above 0 0 0 0 1 6 1 
 
       
All reported firms 1 1 3 3 19 15 12 
Source: own survey 
 
 
 41 
 
Table 6: Top market destination countries for Ethiopian flower export 2008 
 
Top market destination countries 2008 Region 
exports millions 
USD 
% of total 
exports 
Netherlands EU 92.37 88.19 
Germany EU 3.95 3.77 
United Kingdom EU 1.54 1.47 
Japan Japan 1.32 1.26 
United Arab Emirates Middle East 1.28 1.23 
Saudi Arabia Middle East 0.83 0.79 
Russian Federation East Europe 0.68 0.65 
Israel Middle East 0.61 0.58 
Ireland EU 0.46 0.43 
Norway EU 0.41 0.39 
South Africa Africa 0.27 0.26 
France EU 0.16 0.15 
Cyprus EU 0.12 0.12 
Australia Australia 0.11 0.10 
    
EU total  99.02 94.53 
All countries with 100,000 USD and above export  104.09 99.38 
World  104.74 100.00 
Source: own survey 
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